anselms argument from what it is possible to conceive is what type of argument?
Anselm, "Ontological Argument"
Philosophy of Religion
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Introduction to Philosophy
Anselm's "Ontological Argument"
Abstract: Anselms's Ontological Statement is stated, and a few standard objections to his argument are listed.
- St. Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) was a Neoplatonic Realist and was oftentimes chosen "the 2nd Augustine."
- The doctrine of realism implies that the extent to which anything is real is dependent upon its degree of universality; hence, God is the virtually real. Other existent things in the earth are emanations from archetypes.
- The general idea of the ontological argument is based on the notion that the concept of God equally the greatest being implies that God exists—if not, there could be something greater, namely an existent greatest being—but this being would be God.
- The structure of the Ontological Statement tin can exist outlined as follows (The statement is based on Anselm's Proslogion 2):
- We conceive of God as a beingness than which no greater can be conceived.
- This being than which no greater can exist conceived either exists in the heed lone or both in the listen and in reality.
- Assume that this being than which no greater can exist conceived exists in the listen alone.
- Existing both in the mind and in reality is greater than existing solely in the mind.
- This being, existing in the heed alone, can as well be conceived to exist in reality.
- This being existing in the mind alone is not therefore the beingness than which no greater can be conceived. (Run into statement one above.)
- Therefore, this being than which no greater can be conceived exists in reality as well as exists in the mind.
- Some standard objections to the Ontological Statement are listed below. (References to the formal logical background given beneath can be safely omitted by the introductory student.)
- The Perfect Island Objection: Gaunilo argues that the concept of a perfect isle does not thereby testify the beingness of an isle. Perfection in this instance does non imply "beingness." Gaunilo argues by illustration that if we insert the phrase "perfect island" for "God" pari passu in Anselm's Ontological Argument, no one would reasonably conclude that the existence of a perfect island has been proved. (Cf, the strategy of analogical refutations in syllogistic logic at Refutation by Means of Devising a Logical Analogy. The important logical indicate is that true premises and a fake decision can never occur in a valid statement. If we can construct a similar statement to a given argument with the same form equally the original with true premisses and a faux conclusion, and then the given argument is also shown to exist invalid.)
- Anselm'southward Respond: There is no contradiction in denying the existence of a perfect isle, but there is in denying God'southward existence. (Annotation: does Anselm relate an intuitive recognition of the distinction betwixt à priori and à posteriori truth?)
- Anselm notes the but way God tin can be conceived of non to exist is to excogitate of the word "God" not existing since this kind of perfection implies existence. (Annotation: it'south difficult to phrase Anslem's objection without circularity—cf, the breezy fallacy of petitio principii.
- The "Fool'south Objection": Anselm's definition of God as " the being than which no greater can be conceived" is impossible to understand—there is no clear and distinct idea of a "beingness than which no greater can be conceived." (Annotation: how this idea of a beingness than which no greater tin be conceived is aproximated in such a manner that it is similar to the notion of infinitesimals or the notion limit afterwards adult in the calculus by Newton and Leibniz.)
- Anselm's Reply: If one does not understand the definition, then one is a fool. Y'all cannot argue with a fool. (Anselm hither tin be charged with committing the fallacy of ad hominem).
- Anselm believes that one must suppose a minimum of intelligence in anyone considering the argument—but, of class, the burden of proof in this regard is on Anselm. Cf, the related ideas of the prinicple of charity and the argumentum advertising ignorantiam
- Objection of "Existence is not a Predicate":In the consideration of any idea i cannot get outside of the formulation to reality; Anselm's argument compares the conception of existing in the mind with the conception of existing in reality. Still, an argument tin can merely deal with concepts, not real things in the external world. Every bit Immanuel Kant argues, one cannot compare the value of the idea of 100 thalers (i.e., coins) with 100 real thalers.
Nosotros assume existence in our conversation and arguments—nosotros do not testify existence. Consider this case: 1 doesn't laud someone you are to ally to your folks, and the add, "Oh by the way, that person really exists."
Ane cannot argue towards being. One cannot prove being. (Q.v., As Søren Kierkegaard points out, you cannot prove existence of Napoleon by his deeds, because to mention his deeds is to presume the being of someone who did them. Then whatsoever such statement presupposes the being of the subject area information technology talks about.)
See also the related logical problem of existential import of statements in Aristotelian logic. If the existence of something is implied past a statement, and so the statement is said to have "existential import." For Aristotle, statements of the form, "All Southward's are P's" imply that there is at least i real South that is a P, whereas in modern logic (quantification theory), no such existential delivery of universal statements is implied.
(Note that Anselm's argument is similar in grade to Socrates' defense in the Apology confronting the charge that he is an atheist: he argues he is not an atheist because his accusers recognize he believes in divine things.)
- Anselm'south Reply: No, not at all—Anselm believes he is not but comparison ideas. The comparing is betwixt existing in the mind alone and existing in the mind and in reality. Both of these are idea of as they are, not thought of equally in the mind. (Annotation: Nevertheless how can this objection exist phrased without the notion of "the idea or idea" of existence…)
- If Anselm is wrong here, it would seem to follow that deductive arguments (i.e., à priori arguments) are of no use to proving things almost the nature of the world of existent entities. Instead, this kind of rationality merely shows the relations of ideas to other ideas.
- The Perfect Island Objection: Gaunilo argues that the concept of a perfect isle does not thereby testify the beingness of an isle. Perfection in this instance does non imply "beingness." Gaunilo argues by illustration that if we insert the phrase "perfect island" for "God" pari passu in Anselm's Ontological Argument, no one would reasonably conclude that the existence of a perfect island has been proved. (Cf, the strategy of analogical refutations in syllogistic logic at Refutation by Means of Devising a Logical Analogy. The important logical indicate is that true premises and a fake decision can never occur in a valid statement. If we can construct a similar statement to a given argument with the same form equally the original with true premisses and a faux conclusion, and then the given argument is also shown to exist invalid.)
Further Reading:
- Anselm of Canterbury. Wikipedia'south reprint from the scholarly 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica on Anselm'south life and works.
- Anselm, "The Ontological Statement" A short selection of Anselm's argument from Proslogium 2 in the online Reading for Philosophical Research on this site.
- Ontological Arguments. A good discussion with extensive links to the history, classification, and archetype objections to various versions of the ontological argument by Graham Oppy in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- The Ontological Statement. Anselm's argument together with Gaunilo's, Aquinas' and Kant's objections are conveniently summarized by Kenneth Einar Himma in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. This entry is a good place to starting time for clarification of the above notes to the argument.
"For I do non seek to empathize in social club to believe; I believe in order to sympathize. For I likewise believe that 'Unless I believe, I shall not understand.'" St Anselm, Proslogion I, trans. Thomas Williams (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing, 2001) half-dozen.
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